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Abstract
We argue that foreign direct investment (FDI) in the Arab world is no source of
economic growth as, for example, it is for the East Asian Tigers. This is particularly
noteworthy for the diversified economies, which had the highest FDI shares among
developing areas at the end of the 1970s, before the region lost ground to other
developing areas. The result is less surprising for the oil countries, which not only have
the least diversified economies and thus the least absorptive capacity, but also the lowest
FDI shares. What are the causes of these observations? We argue that the outward-
orientation and democratization deficit to other developing areas have prevented the
attraction of enough FDI that could have been translated into growth impulses in the Arab
world.
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1. Introduction
The Arab world, both the diversified and oil economies, lack substantially behind in attracting
foreign direct investment (FDI). As a percentage of GDP, the diversified economies (as a
population weighted group) never attracted more than two percent of GDP in FDI while the oil
economies (also as a population weighted group), regularly stayed even far below one percent of
GDP. FDI between 2001 and 2005 in the diversified and oil economies, for example, averaged
only 1.95 and 0.57 percent, respectively. Latin America and the Caribbean, which is probably the
best reference group to the Arab world, attracted more than three percent during the same period.
Similarly, the group of the East Asian Tigers consisting of South Korea, Hong Kong, Macao,
Malaysia, and Singapore also attracted more than three percent. The world average was 2.28
percent.
Particularly tragic is the case of the diversified region, which during the oil boom between 1976
and 1980 had the highest FDI share relative to its GDP. Still in the following five years, between
1981 and 1985, the diversified economies’ FDI share was considerable. Towards the end of the
1980s, however, the diversified economies lost constantly ground to especially Latin America
and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, and there in particular to the East Asian Tigers, and
the transformation economies of Eastern and Central Europe.
A comparison of the Arab world to East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean,
and Eastern and Central Europe is insightful for the formulation of relevant hypotheses.
Beginning with the comparison between East Asia and the Pacific and the Arab world, an
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obvious important difference is that East Asia and the Pacific pursued an outward-oriented
development strategy and the Arab world an inward-oriented one. On the other hand, differences
in political liberalization stand out when comparing Latin America and the Caribbean and
Eastern and Central Europe to the Arab world, which, like a rock, resisted the democratization
waves that swept most developing areas since the 1980s.
As opposed to the study of the levels of FDI, research on the impact of FDI on economic
development and growth in the Arab world is rather scarce, which can be attributed, at least
partially, to data constraints on the country level. By introducing a balanced panel dataset with
population weighted regional averages as observations, we try to reduce this problem somewhat.
Moreover, working with developing areas as units of observations rather than countries will
allows us drawing some important differences from a global perspective, which seem to us
underrepresented in the literature.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two briefly reviews the literature on
FDI with respect to the Arab world. Section three discusses the data and methodology subject to
our study. Section four presents the empirical results. We conclude with a summary of our main
findings in section five.
2. Literature Review
It is generally acknowledged that the Arab world only attracts a disproportionately small amount
of foreign direct investment. Henry and Springborg (2001, p. 46 f.) attribute this to the region’s
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inward-oriented trade regime and lack of political freedom. Various reasons must be named to
explain the region’s trade-related and political stand.
Historically, the region’s long tradition of anti-trade sentiments is part of their colonial legacy,
which happened to bring political regimes to power that were opposed to the interests of private
commercial elites (Henry and Springborg, 2001, pp. 8-21). This is particularly true for North
Africa and the Levant. The only exception is Lebanon, which is the only country where an
entrepreneurial middle class was not confronted by the new regime at independence. In the oil
rich economies, on the other hand, the productive sector was traditionally much weaker while the
discovery of oil did not put economic diversification on the top of political leaders’ agenda. To
this adds that even early development theory was in support of inward-orientation (Nafziger, pp.
144-148).
With respect to political liberalization, it is important to remember that not only most developing
areas started out with authoritarian regimes, but also that there was not a single political-
economic theory that would have suggested that democracies are favorable to economic
development. Accordingly, early development economists called for strong states rather than
strong democracies. Of course, these scholars did not explicitly call for authoritarianism, but the
benevolent dictator was implicit to all their theories, be it balanced (big push) or unbalanced
growth strategies (Nurkse, 1953, Hirschman, 1958) or Keynesian growth theory in the spirit of
Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946).
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In addition to the evolution of trade and political regime characteristics that were potentially
undermining the Arab world’s FDI attractiveness, geo-economic and geo-political factors are not
much less grave. Geo-economically, the non-compatible production profile of the region with
natural-resource rent extractors in the Gulf and diversified economies in the rest of the Arab
World prevented spillover effects from capital-agglomeration, which are a cornerstone of
endogenous growth theory (see, for example, Romer, 1990). Another adverse factor is the
region’s country risk, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict (Elbadawi, 2005).
Trade and political development related aspects are recurring parameters in empirical studies of
the determinants of foreign direct investment in the Arab world. For example, Onyeiwu (2003)
concludes that lack of openness is a significant deterrent to FDI attraction in the MENA region,
Moosa (2004) and Nabli et al (2008) list country risk as an important FDI attractor, and Kamaly
(2002) provides empirical evidence for that democracy stimulates FDI inflows.
Comparatively little research, however, has been conducted with respect to the dynamic aspects
of FDI on growth. A recent paper by Laureti and Postiglione (2005) is an exception. This paper
uses a sample of Mediterranean countries, including Arab economies. Yet, our approach is
different in regards to that our sample makes use of regions as units of observations and a longer
time frame.
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3. Methodology and Data
Our methodological innovation is that we do not examine individual countries but population
weighted regional observations. The regions are: Diversified Arab Economies (DivMENA),
Arab oil economies (OilMENA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub Saharan Africa
(SSA), South Asia (SA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), East Asian Tigers (EAT), Oceania
(OCE), North America (NAM), Western Europe (WE), AND Eastern and Central Europe (ECE).
Appendix Table 1 lists the countries in each sample.
Appendix Item 1 Here [Countries in Regions]
The reason for using population weighted regions as units of observations rather than countries is
the firm belief that foreign direct investment decisions depend on regional factors foremost,
especially since local markets are often small. The fact that a region is more than the sum of the
countries seems to be worth the effort of aggregating countries and comparing them to other
regions.
In order to conduct our empirical analysis, we built a panel dataset. Each unit of observation has
seven five-year population weighted average time observations. The first observation is the
average of the 1971-1975 period and the seventh the average of the 2001-2005 period. We opted
for averages in order to smooth out erratic observations.
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Thefirst question of interest is whether a one percentage change of GDP in terms of FDI has a
different impact on economic development in the Arab world than in reference regions. We use
the following variables: Per capita income in 2000 USD (lnycap) and foreign direct investment
in percent of GDP (FDI). We additionally construct separate interaction term between
DivMENA, OilMENA, and EAT with their respective FDI shares. Moreover, we test for the
significance of gross capital formation (GCF), a democratization score (Polity), and
manufacturing export capacity as a percentage of GDP (Manu).
The second question of interest is whether stagnating levels of FDI in the Arab world can be
explained by the lack of productive outward-orientation and its democracy deficit. To test for
this we construct two more variables. One is the difference of the manufacturing export share as
a percentage of GDP of any region to the region of the East Asian Tigers and the other the
difference between the democratization levels of the regions to the world average. These
variables are labeled ManuDiff and DemoDiff. The description of the variables and the dataset
itself are attached in Appendix Tables two and three.
Appendix Item 2 Here [Data Description]
Appendix Item 3 Here [Dataset]
4. Empirical Results
We begin our empirical analysis with a comparative visualization of the four key variables
subject to this study, which are per capita income, foreign direct investment, manufacturing
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export shares, and democratization. In the following time series plot, we always display the
values of the diversified Arab economies (DivMENA), the Arab oil economies (OilMENA),
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Sub Saharan Africa (SSA), East Asian Tigers (EAT),
Eastern and Central Europe (ECE) and the world as a whole (World).
Appendix item four illustrates the development of income for these regions. It shows that among
the six developing areas under consideration all had real per capita income levels that were
below the world average at the beginning of the 1960s. In the first half of the 1960s, Latin
America and the Caribbean was the richest developing area, followed by Eastern and Central
Europe, the East Asian Tigers, the Arab oil economies, the diversified Arab economies, and Sub
Saharan Africa. By the end of the 1970s, the oil boom pushed the oil economies on top of all
developing areas. Not less impressive is the income development of the East Asian Tigers while
the other developing areas grew at the same or even smaller rate than the world average. In the
post oil boom era, the East Asian Tigers left behind all other regions while the Arab oil
economies experienced a hard landing. Real income in the diversified Arab economies began to
stagnate. Only beginning with the end of the 1990s does the growth trajectory point slightly
upwards again.
Appendix Item 4 here [Time Series Plot Income]
Looking at FDI as a percentage of GDP in Appendix Item 5 shows that during the period
between 1971 and 1975 the East Asian Tigers enjoyed the highest shares. During the same time,
FDI in the East Asian Tigers region dropped by more than two percentage points while FDI
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sharesin the diversified economies were suddenly the highest. This indicates that the diversified
economies benefitted from rising oil prices in terms of FDI whereas the drop of FDI shares in the
oil economies plummeted as a result of rising incomes. Beginning with the second half of the
1980s, global FDI increased rapidly, with the exception of the Arab world, which was
increasingly falling behind between the mid 1980s and mid 1990s. During the second half of the
1990s, FDI in the diversified economies even dropped substantially, which, most probably, was
the result of the relocation of international funds to Eastern and Central Europe after the fall of
the Berlin wall. During the period between 2001 and 2005, the diversified and oil economies
were the only developing areas with FDI shares below the world average.
Appendix Item 5 here [Time Series Plot FDI]
A comparison with the East Asian Tigers is always insightful as it is the only region that has
pursued a manufacturing-ignited outward-orientation strategy. Appendix Item 6 visualizes the
pace at which the region of the East Asian Tigers has developed manufacturing export capacities.
The very fact that a region produces for global markets makes it most naturally attractive for
foreign direct investment as it best exemplifies absorptive capacity. The time scatter plot further
shows that traditional import-substitution regions such as the diversified Arab economies, Latin
America and the Caribbean, and Sub Saharan Africa still suffer from the legacy of import
substitution policies that dominated the period between independence and the 1980s. In addition
to the East Asian Tigers, also Eastern and Central Europe have built manufacturing export
capacities greater than the world average since the 1990s. This was substantially favored by its
closeness to the European Union, which is an advantage other developing areas lack.
10 
 
AppendixItem 6 here [Time Series Plot Manufacturing Export Shares]
The general increase in FDI that began in the mid 1980s and mostly bypassed the Arab world
can be attributed to the end of the Cold War and the democratization wave that swept through
most developing areas, except for the Arab world. The fact that FDI responds positively to
political thaw is typically explained by greater security for property rights and economic
liberalization that accompanies democratization (Przeworski, 1993). As Appendix Item 7
visualizes, the Arab world had already been the most authoritarian region in the 1960s and has
made only moderate political liberalization progress since then. Interestingly, however, the oil
economies seem to have made even more political progress than the diversified economies.
Appendix Item 7 here [Time Series Plot Democratization]
With the above descriptive illustrations of key indicators in mind, we approach next the question
of whether there is also a statistically significant impact of FDI on growth in the Arab world. Our
model is based on the Arellano-Bond two-step estimator, which uses the finite-sample correction
mechanism proposed by Windmeijer (2005). The model is run using the open-source software
“Gnu Regression, Econometrics, and Time-Series Library” (Gretl), developed by Cottrell and
Lucchetti (online).The regression results are summarized in Appendix Item 8.
Appendix Item 8 here [Growth and FDI Dynamic Panel Results]
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Individually, manufacturing export shares (Manu) is the most dominant and robust factor in
explaining growth among other factors such as gross capital formation (GCF), FDI, and Polity
(Models I to IV). FDI is still significant at the 15% significance level (Model II). When running
Manu and FDI together, however, Manu drives out FDI (Model V). In order to test whether
eventually the Arab region’s FDI shares are significant, we add in Model VI the interaction terms
of the diversified and oil Arab regions with their FDI shares. Yet, these interaction terms are far
from statistically meaningful while the variable manufacturing export shares maintains its
significance. We therefore feel safe to conclude that FDI in the Arab world has no direct growth
effect whatsoever. Yet, in order to see that FDI can make a difference, one has to take the case of
the East Asian Tigers, whose FDI shares are statistically highly significant and even drives out
manufacturing export shares (Model VII).
From a visual inspection of the FDI time-series plot, it stands out that FDI levels in the Arab
world are relatively constant when compared to other developing areas, which experienced a
sharp increase of FDI inflows since the mid 1980s. Obviously, in order for a regression on
differenced variables to generate significant coefficients, more variation of FDI in the Arab
world, reflected by an upward trend like other regions, would have been necessary at least. The
Arab world, however, did not share this development with other regions. The final question we
therefore want to answer is why.
The sharp increase of FDI in many parts of the developing world began in the mid 1980s, which
coincided with two major developments. One was economic and the other political. The
economic development was the rise of the East Asian Tigers and the political the transition to
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democratization in most parts of the developing world. We therefore test lastly the hypothesis
whether the difference of manufacturing exports to the levels of those by the East Asian Tigers
as well as the difference in democratization to the world average can explain the levels of FDI
for different developing areas. To test for this we use a robust fixed effects panel model with
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent residuals as proposed by Arellano (2003). The
regression is again run using “Gretl.” Appendix Item 9 summarizes the result.
Appendix Item 9 [Levels of FDI and the Role of Manufacturing Exports and Democracy]
The results suggest that manufacturing export shares and democracy are indeed statistically
significant variables to explain FDI shares, while gross capital formation and per capita income
are not (Model I). Yet, not only do manufacturing export shares and democracy levels matter for
the attraction of FDI, but also their relative difference to benchmark cases. Model II shows that
the differences to the manufacturing export shares of the East Asian Tigers and the average
world democracy level are statistically significant, too. The greater is the difference in
manufacturing export shares to the EAT, the lower is FDI. Similarly, the greater is the
democracy surplus, the greater is FDI. Model III finally adds to Model II the Arab region
specific manufacturing export and democracy differences. The results indicate that the
manufacturing export share differences to the EAT are statistically not meaningful while the
differences in democratization are. In the case of the diversified region, the democracy deficit is
actually associated with an above trend level of FDI and in case of the oil region with a below
trend level. This can be interpreted as that the diversified region owes political reforms to foreign
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directinvestors. In the case of the oil economies, foreign direct investors seems to have already
written off political reforms.
5. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the role of FDI for economic development in the Arab world. Our
innovation is to introduce a panel dataset with regions rather than countries as units of
observations. This allows for a more global perspective, which we believe is inherent to FDI
decisions.
We mainly work with two models. The first is a dynamic panel approach to gauge the effects of
FDI on growth. Foreign direct investment, according to our study, is clearly no source of
economic growth in the Arab world, neither in the diversified nor in the oil economies. A
significant role of FDI on growth, however, could be identified for the East Asian Tigers. The
problem is that relative to other regions, the Arab world has essentially maintained constant FDI
shares when competitor regions have increased them considerably beginning with the mid 1980s.
This observation led us to our second model, which asks why the Arab world has lost touch to
other regions.
Given the global political-economic context, which was dominated in the 1980s by the rise of the
East Asian Tigers and the spread of democratization, we test their significance on FDI. For this
we use a fixed-effects panel model with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent
estimators. We find that both democratization and manufacturing export capacity are important
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factorsin explaining FDI shares. A similar result is obtained when testing regions’ differences to
East Asian Tigers’ manufacturing export capacity and the world democracy level. Manufacturing
deficits explain lower FDI shares and democracy surpluses higher ones. Relative to its
democracy deficit, the diversified Arab world has an FDI surplus, the oil Arab world an FDI
deficit.
The policy implications of our paper are obvious on the general level, but tricky in detail.
Trivially, the region must find ways to make their economies and political systems more
competitive. There is little doubt that the Arab world has been continuously falling behind in
terms of economic and political development. Showing this from a globally comparative
perspective was the main objective of the paper. For the development of specific policy
recommendations, learning from other regions seems therefore promising.
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7.Appendix
Appendix Item 1: Countries in Regions
SSA (N=48) LAC (N=38) WE (N=28) EAP (N=12) ECE (N=28)
Angola Antigua & Barbuda Andorra Brunei Albania
Benin Argentina Austria Cambodia Armenia
Botswana Aruba Belgium China Azerbaijan
Burkina Faso Bahamas Channel Islands Indonesia Belarus
Burundi Barbados Cyprus Japan Bosnia H.
Cameroon Belize Denmark N. Korea Bulgaria
Cape Verde Bolivia Faeroe Islands Lao PDR Croatia
Central Afr. Rep. Brazil Finland Mongolia Czech Rep.
Chad Cayman Islands France Myanmar Estonia
Comoros Chile Germany Philippines Georgia
Congo, Dem. Rep. Colombia Greece Thailand Hungary
Congo, Rep. Costa Rica Greenland Vietnam Kazakhstan
Cote d'Ivoire Cuba Iceland Kyrgyz Rep.
Equatorial Guinea Dominica Ireland EAT (N=5) Latvia
Eritrea Dominican Rep. Isle of Man Hong Kong Lithuania
Ethiopia Ecuador Italy Korea, Rep. Macedonia
Gabon El Salvador Liechtenstein Macao Moldova
Gambia, The Grenada Luxembourg Malaysia Poland
Ghana Guatemala Malta Singapore Romania
Guinea Guyana Monaco Russia
Guinea-Bissau Haiti Netherlands OilMENA (N=10) Serbia
Kenya Honduras Norway Algeria Slovak Rep.
Lesotho Jamaica Portugal Bahrain Slovenia
Liberia Mexico San Marino Iran Tajikistan
Madagascar Netherlands Antilles Spain Iraq Turkey
Malawi Nicaragua Sweden Kuwait Turkmenistan
Mali Panama Switzerland Libya Ukraine
Mauritania Paraguay United Kingdom Oman Uzbekistan
Mauritius Peru Qatar
Mayotte Puerto Rico OCE (N=18) KSA
Mozambique St. Kitts & Nevis American Samoa UAE
Namibia St. Lucia Australia
Niger St. Vincent & Gren. Fiji DivMENA (N=10)
Nigeria Suriname French Polynesia Djibouti
Rwanda Trinidad & Tobago Guam Egypt
Senegal Uruguay Kiribati Israel
Seychelles Venezuela, RB Marshall Islands Jordan
Sierra Leone Virgin Islands (U.S.) Micronesia Lebanon
Somalia New Caledonia Morocco
South Africa SA (N=8) New Zealand Syria
Sudan Afghanistan N. Mariana Islands Tunisia
Swaziland Bangladesh Palau Palestine
São Tomé & Principe Bhutan Papua New Guinea Yemen
Tanzania India Samoa
Togo Maldives Solomon Islands NAM (N=3)
Uganda Nepal Timor-Leste Bermuda
Zambia Pakistan Tonga Canada
Zimbabwe Sri Lanka Vanuatu United States
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AppendixItem 2: Data Description
Variable Name Description and Source
Lnycap Natural log of GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD, Source: 2007 World BankDevelopment Indicator Database (2007 WDI)
FDI
Net inflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10 percent
or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy other than
that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings,
other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the balance of
payments. This series shows net inflows in the reporting economy and is
divided by GDP. Source: 2007 WDI
GCF Gross capital formation (% GDP), Source: 2007 WDI
Manu Manufacturing export share as a percentage of GDP. Source: Calculated from2007 WDI.
Polity
Polity 2 score from Polity IV dataset, which can take values between minus and
plus ten. The authors of Polity IV suggest interpreting countries with a polity
score in the range between minus ten and minus six as autocracies. Polity scores
between minus five and plus five capture anocracies or partial democracies. In
essence, anocracies are states behind a democratic façade or otherwise
malfunctioning democracies. Polity scores between plus six and ten can be read
as full democracies. Source: Marshall M. G. and Jaggers K. (online), Polity IV
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2007,
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm.
DivFDI Interaction term between FDI and DivMENA
OilFDI Interaction term between FDI and OilMENA
EATFDI Interaction term between FDI and East Asian Tigers region
ManuDiff Region’s manufacturing export share minus EAT’s manufacturing export share
DemoDiff Average world polity score minus average region’s polity score
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AppendixItem 3: Dataset
Obs Year lnycap GCF FDI MANU Polity ManuDiff WorldPolDiff DivFDI OilFDI EATFDI
DivMENA 1970 6.84 15.19 0.49 2.56 -6.31 -7.15 -5.44 0.49 0.00 0.00
DivMENA 1975 7.06 20.14 0.21 3.26 -6.46 -14.37 -5.46 0.21 0.00 0.00
DivMENA 1980 7.23 29.45 1.53 3.59 -6.19 -20.28 -5.31 1.53 0.00 0.00
DivMENA 1985 7.36 27.66 1.55 3.77 -6.16 -24.97 -5.54 1.55 0.00 0.00
DivMENA 1990 7.43 25.27 1.59 6.99 -5.93 -28.74 -6.22 1.59 0.00 0.00
DivMENA 1995 7.48 22.30 1.76 6.11 -5.33 -34.09 -7.14 1.76 0.00 0.00
DivMENA 2000 7.59 21.89 0.91 6.24 -4.94 -45.45 -7.36 0.91 0.00 0.00
DivMENA 2005 7.66 20.67 1.95 7.28 -4.17 -51.78 -7.12 1.95 0.00 0.00
OilMENA 1970 7.51 28.00 0.14 0.90 -9.04 -8.81 -8.17 0.00 0.14 0.00
OilMENA 1975 8.07 27.00 0.97 1.73 -9.16 -15.90 -8.17 0.00 0.97 0.00
OilMENA 1980 8.38 30.57 0.48 2.13 -7.70 -21.75 -6.82 0.00 0.48 0.00
OilMENA 1985 8.28 27.66 0.02 3.20 -7.53 -25.55 -6.91 0.00 0.02 0.00
OilMENA 1990 8.08 23.59 -0.05 3.18 -7.19 -32.55 -7.48 0.00 -0.05 0.00
OilMENA 1995 8.13 30.56 0.10 2.63 -6.96 -37.56 -8.77 0.00 0.10 0.00
OilMENA 2000 8.16 27.78 0.27 2.19 -3.52 -49.50 -5.94 0.00 0.27 0.00
OilMENA 2005 8.37 29.66 0.57 2.88 -2.98 -56.18 -5.93 0.00 0.57 0.00
LAC 1970 7.84 20.20 0.22 0.86 -4.35 -8.84 -3.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAC 1975 8.02 22.13 0.95 1.65 -3.68 -15.98 -2.68 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAC 1980 8.15 23.29 0.76 2.26 -2.61 -21.61 -1.73 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAC 1985 8.15 19.96 0.85 3.09 0.36 -25.66 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAC 1990 8.15 20.35 0.78 4.42 4.94 -31.31 4.65 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAC 1995 8.19 20.47 1.38 5.70 5.81 -34.49 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAC 2000 8.27 21.47 3.71 7.76 6.80 -43.93 4.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAC 2005 8.27 20.16 3.05 9.31 7.40 -49.75 4.45 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSA 1970 6.42 15.08 0.25 0.69 -4.88 -9.01 -4.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSA 1975 6.53 19.23 1.01 1.61 -5.99 -16.02 -4.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSA 1980 6.53 20.42 0.59 1.72 -4.47 -22.15 -3.60 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSA 1985 6.36 15.83 0.51 1.41 -4.26 -27.33 -3.64 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSA 1990 6.29 16.37 0.93 1.30 -5.69 -34.43 -5.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSA 1995 6.21 16.88 1.50 2.15 -2.03 -38.05 -3.83 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSA 2000 6.23 17.67 2.84 3.07 0.05 -48.62 -2.37 0.00 0.00 0.00
SSA 2005 6.29 19.57 3.65 3.65 2.29 -55.41 -0.66 0.00 0.00 0.00
SA 1970 5.35 14.84 0.02 1.84 7.55 -7.86 8.41 0.00 0.00 0.00
SA 1975 5.38 15.86 0.04 2.31 7.12 -15.32 8.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
SA 1980 5.45 18.75 0.04 3.11 5.02 -20.77 5.89 0.00 0.00 0.00
SA 1985 5.56 21.09 0.06 2.81 5.06 -25.94 5.68 0.00 0.00 0.00
SA 1990 5.72 22.19 0.10 3.93 5.92 -31.80 5.63 0.00 0.00 0.00
SA 1995 5.87 22.49 0.29 6.58 7.86 -33.62 6.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
SA 2000 6.06 22.60 0.68 7.59 7.87 -44.10 5.44 0.00 0.00 0.00
SA 2005 6.24 26.57 0.90 8.64 6.91 -50.42 3.96 0.00 0.00 0.00
EAP 1970 7.32 22.65 0.20 3.16 -6.13 -6.55 -5.27 0.00 0.00 0.00
EAP 1975 7.57 28.22 1.85 3.84 -6.09 -13.78 -5.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
EAP 1980 7.69 31.55 0.47 4.66 -5.49 -19.22 -4.62 0.00 0.00 0.00
EAP 1985 7.79 32.81 0.30 4.22 -5.41 -24.52 -4.79 0.00 0.00 0.00
EAP 1990 7.92 33.85 0.83 8.68 -4.92 -27.05 -5.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
EAP 1995 8.04 36.49 3.51 15.11 -4.75 -25.09 -6.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
EAP 2000 8.11 33.00 3.39 17.43 -4.10 -34.26 -6.52 0.00 0.00 0.00
EAP 2005 8.20 35.40 2.52 23.70 -3.18 -35.37 -6.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
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AppendixItem 3: Dataset (Contd.)
Obs Year lnycap GCF FDI MANU Polity ManuDiff WorldPolDiff DivFDI OilFDI EATFDI
EAT 1970 7.55 23.54 0.44 9.70 3.58 0.00 4.45 0.00 0.00 7.55
EAT 1975 7.86 26.21 3.52 17.63 -3.37 0.00 -2.37 0.00 0.00 7.86
EAT 1980 8.17 29.96 1.17 23.88 -4.73 0.00 -3.85 0.00 0.00 8.17
EAT 1985 8.41 30.39 1.45 28.74 -2.53 0.00 -1.91 0.00 0.00 8.41
EAT 1990 8.73 30.40 1.69 35.73 2.91 0.00 2.61 0.00 0.00 8.73
EAT 1995 9.02 37.27 2.68 40.19 4.96 0.00 3.16 0.00 0.00 9.02
EAT 2000 9.21 31.91 3.79 51.69 5.43 0.00 3.01 0.00 0.00 9.21
EAT 2005 9.36 26.55 3.04 59.06 5.85 0.00 2.90 0.00 0.00 9.36
OCE 1970 9.18 25.92 2.34 1.75 10.00 -7.96 10.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
OCE 1975 9.28 27.44 1.98 2.31 10.00 -15.31 11.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OCE 1980 9.33 25.51 1.23 2.71 10.00 -21.16 10.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
OCE 1985 9.38 26.77 1.80 2.49 10.00 -26.26 10.62 0.00 0.00 0.00
OCE 1990 9.47 25.40 2.99 2.89 10.00 -32.84 9.71 0.00 0.00 0.00
OCE 1995 9.52 22.30 2.53 4.54 10.00 -35.66 8.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
OCE 2000 9.65 22.80 2.38 4.40 10.00 -47.29 7.58 0.00 0.00 0.00
OCE 2005 9.75 19.69 1.82 4.25 10.00 -54.81 7.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAM 1970 9.76 19.73 1.82 3.18 10.00 -6.53 10.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAM 1975 9.86 19.88 0.34 4.08 10.00 -13.55 11.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAM 1980 9.97 21.15 0.45 5.27 10.00 -18.61 10.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAM 1985 10.04 20.19 0.52 5.17 10.00 -23.57 10.62 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAM 1990 10.18 19.18 1.08 5.33 10.00 -30.40 9.71 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAM 1995 10.24 17.34 0.63 6.76 10.00 -33.43 8.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAM 2000 10.36 19.81 2.36 8.16 10.00 -43.53 7.58 0.00 0.00 0.00
NAM 2005 10.45 14.98 1.13 7.19 10.00 -51.88 7.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
WE 1970 9.24 23.71 0.76 9.92 6.95 0.21 7.82 0.00 0.00 0.00
WE 1975 9.43 26.00 0.75 13.55 7.43 -4.08 8.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
WE 1980 9.54 24.17 0.58 15.31 9.28 -8.57 10.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
WE 1985 9.61 21.43 0.52 16.67 9.62 -12.07 10.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
WE 1990 9.74 22.20 1.17 16.69 9.85 -19.03 9.55 0.00 0.00 0.00
WE 1995 9.83 20.41 1.16 16.56 9.85 -23.63 8.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
WE 2000 9.93 20.48 4.16 20.50 9.85 -31.19 7.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
WE 2005 10.02 20.12 2.79 22.07 9.85 -37.00 6.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECE 1970 7.42 21.58 0.06 1.17 -5.63 -8.54 -4.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECE 1975 7.56 19.78 0.23 1.63 -5.90 -16.00 -4.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECE 1980 7.70 21.58 0.04 6.00 -5.67 -17.87 -4.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECE 1985 7.67 23.77 0.11 8.63 -5.99 -20.11 -5.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECE 1990 7.66 28.56 0.58 11.05 -2.93 -24.68 -3.23 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECE 1995 7.56 26.07 1.92 13.36 4.02 -26.83 2.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECE 2000 7.56 21.53 2.42 14.12 4.20 -37.57 1.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECE 2005 7.77 22.13 3.30 17.38 5.21 -41.68 2.26 0.00 0.00 0.00
WORLD 1970 8.11 19.74 1.44 3.23 -0.86 -6.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WORLD 1975 8.29 23.08 0.64 4.59 -1.00 -13.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WORLD 1980 8.37 25.32 0.40 5.40 -0.88 -18.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WORLD 1985 8.38 25.09 0.40 5.27 -0.62 -23.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WORLD 1990 8.43 25.90 0.73 7.60 0.29 -28.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WORLD 1995 8.46 26.59 1.83 10.46 1.81 -29.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WORLD 2000 8.53 25.14 2.55 12.20 2.42 -39.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WORLD 2005 8.61 26.75 2.28 14.90 2.95 -44.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: All values are population weighted regional averages.
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AppendixItem 4: Time Series Plot Income
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AppendixItem 5: Time Series Plot FDI
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AppendixItem 6: Time Series Plot Manufacturing Export Shares as a Percentage of GDP
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AppendixItem 7: Time Series Plot Polity 2 Score
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AppendixItem 8: Growth and FDI Dynamic Panel Results
2-Sep Arellano-Bond estimates using 72 observations, 12 cross-sectional units
DV: DLnycap I II III IV V VI VII
DLnycap(-1) 0.51*** 0.56*** 0.39*** 0.48*** 0.44*** 0.39** 0.33***
Const 0.03*** 0.02* 0.02** 0.04*** 0.02 0.03* 0.03***
DGCF 0.00
DFDI 0.02* 0.01
DMANU 0.01*** 0.01***
DPolity -0.00
D(OilFDI) 0.13
D(DIVFDI) -0.00
D(EATFDI) 0.38**
Test for AR(1) errors (0.29) (0.31) (0.19) (0.29) (0.22) (0.40) (0.20)
Test for AR(2) errors (0.51) (0.53) (0.74) (0.41) (0.74) (0.71) (0.77)
Sargan over-identification
test (0.94) (0.95) (0.96) (0.95) (0.95) (1.0) (0.98)
Wald (joint) test: (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Note: * = significant at 15%, ** =significant at 10%, *** = significant at 5%; numbers in parentheses p-
values for
H0: No AR(1) error,” H0: No AR(1) error, H0: Valid Instruments (Sargan test), and H0: No joint
significance (Wald).
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AppendixItem 9: Levels of FDI and the Role of Manufacturing Exports and Democracy
Fixed-Effects Model, using 96 observations, 12 cross-sectional units,
Time-series length = 8
Robust (HAC) standard errors
I II III
Intercept 1.18 -4.22** -4.20**
Lnycap -0.14 0.49 0.48*
GCF 0.02 0.03 0.03
Manu 0.06***
Polity 0.13***
ManuDiff -0.03*** -0.04***
DemoDiff 0.10** 0.11***
(DivMENA  ManuDiff) 0.01
(OilMENA  ManuDiff) 0.11
(DivMENA  DemoDiff) 0.04***
(OilMENA  DemoDiff) -0.08***
Adj. R2 50.0 45.6 47.9
Note: * = significant at 15%, ** =significant at 10%, *** = significant at 5%
